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One of the most striking results in experimental economics is the ease with which market 
bubbles form in a laboratory setting and the difficulty of preventing them. This article re-
examines bubble experiments in light of the results of an earlier series of market experi-
ments that examine how learning occurs in markets characterized by an asymmetry of 
information between buyers and sellers, such as found in Akerlof’s lemons model and 
Spence’s signaling model and extends the arguments put forth in the author’s book, Paving 
Wall Street: Experimental Economics and the Quest for the Perfect Market.
Markets with asymmetric information are incomplete because they lack markets for 
specific levels of product quality. Such markets either lump all qualities together (lemons) 
or using external indications of quality to separate them (signaling). Similarly, the mar-
kets used in bubble experiments are incomplete in that they are lacking a complete set of 
forward or futures markets, depriving traders of the information supplied by the prices 
in those markets. Preliminary experimental results suggest that the addition of a single 
forward market can sometimes mitigate bubble formation and this article suggests more 
extensive research in this direction is warranted. Market bubbles outside of the laboratory 
usually are found in markets in with forward and futures markets that are either legally 
restricted or otherwise limited.
Experimentation in markets with asymmetric information also indicates that the ability 
of subjects to learn how to send and receive signals can be enhanced by changing the way 
that market information is presented to them. We explore how this result might be used to 
help asset markets learn to avoid bubbles.
Keywords:  Market  bubbles,  learning  and  adaptation,  behavioral  finance,  signaling,
 asymmetric informationT
he bubble in Internet-related stocks that formed in the late 1990s and then ultimately 
burst illustrates how markets can exhibit unstable behavior that would appear to 
impugn their both they rationality and efficiency. While some defenders of the effi-
cient-market theory, most notably Peter Garber [1990], claim that the great speculative bub-
bles of history—Dutch tulip mania, the South Sea bubble, John Law’s Mississippi scheme, 
etc.—were not really bubbles but rather reflect a rational market response to conditions of 
low supply and high demand, the experimental examination of markets within a controlled 
laboratory setting beginning with the Vernon Smith, Gerry Suchanek, and Arlington Wil-
liams [1988] study has demonstrated the ease with which bubbles can form. While the 
true supply and demand in a naturally-occurring market can often only be roughly approxi-
mated at best, within the confines of a market laboratory, experimenters can control market 
conditions by the values they induce with payments to their market subjects. With the 
parameters of supply and demand under his or her control, the experimenter can determine 
the degree to which market prices exceed the “rational” level of a competitive equilibrium. 
One can reasonably conclude that a bubble exists when the observed price greatly exceeds 
equilibrium and moves away from it rather than converging towards it.
Given the current body of experimental evidence it appears that bubbles arise from a 
confluence of factors; no single factor appears to be sufficient to generate a bubble in a 
given market. Of the many ingredients that go into a market bubble the one that has cap-
tured the popular imagination is “irrational exuberance,” a phrase made famous by Fed-
eral Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and further popularized by Yale economist 
Robert Schiller [2000]. Irrational exuberance can be viewed as a mass delusion in which 
an item’s “true value” becomes irrelevant as market participants increasingly believe that 
prices will continue to rise forever, or at least until they can sell their holdings to someone 
else. While such beliefs may be reinforced, the practical impossibility of fueling the bubble 
forever eventually leads prices back in line with rational valuations.
Obvious forms of intervention aimed at preventing bubbles or moderating their forma-
tion appear to be ineffectual in the laboratory. Daily price limits, circuit breakers, and 
restrictions on short selling may not only fail to inhibit bubbles, they can actually help to 
promote them by apparently providing traders with a false sense of security that helps fuel 
the bubble. While limitations on price declines can draw out the time it takes for the bubble 
to burst, the absence of market liquidity during this extended decline may make a bad situ-
ation even worse. It appears that the prevention of bubbles cannot be externally imposed Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  2
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on the market mechanism in an effort to put limits on its operation. Instead, a more fruitful 
approach might be to enhance the market mechanism in a way that harnesses its naturally 
tendency towards efficiency under normal circumstances as first demonstrated by Vernon 
Smith [1962] and reproduced countless times thereafter. 
The experimental evidence pointing to the formation and persistence of market bubbles 
did not arise in the vacuum, but is the result of a logical progression of market experiments 
dating back to the original market experiment conducted by Harvard University’s Edward 
Chamberlin in the 1940s. It took 40 years for experimental economists to introduce the 
necessary market features—order books, multiple periods with asset carryover, and specu-
lative traders—to create a laboratory setting sufficiently rich to produce (and reproduce) 
bubbles.1 While the road to isolating market bubbles in the laboratory followed an orderly 
and relative direct progression, market experimentation has spun off several alternative 
threads in the 1970s. One of the more notable threads, which received little attention at rst 
but has been the source of renewed interest among experimental economists in recent years 
of how learning (in a collective sense) occurs in a market setting. 
A number of major advances in economic theory in the 1970s—recognized by the 2001 
Nobel prize awarded to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz—concern 
markets in which information was asymmetrical distributed, usually in such a way that the 
seller of an item knew more about its value than a potential buyer and had no way to convey 
that knowledge directly.  Because informational asymmetries can seriously undermine the 
market mechanism, it often pays sellers to discover a way to signal the value of an item to 
buyers and buyers had to learn how to decode this signal. 
The new thread of market experimentation that explored the specific kind of learning 
required to make signaling and related informational transfer mechanisms work; however, 
all markets can be viewed as implicitly involved learning. Even the simplest supply-and-
demand experiments of Edward Chamberlin [1948] and Vernon Smith [1962] require the 
market to learn the proper price for an item that, in turn, determines the quantity, traded 
at that price. As Smith discovered when he modified Chamberlin’s multilateral bargaining 
arrangement into an organized market patterned after the New York Stock Exchange, the 
ability of the market to learn prices depends on how the market is organized—a discovery 
that influenced the later experimental work of Smith and his many collaborators.
 This article re-examines the results from the experimental studies of market bubbles 
in light of what we now know about how learning occurs in the context of asymmetric 
information. This way of viewing market bubbles suggests several new lines of bubble 
experiments that might be conducted to help determine what causes bubbles and how to 
prevent them. (The exercise of actually running these experiments is left to the reader: no 
new experimental results appear in this article.)Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  3
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The basic answer to the question posed by the title of this article is an unsatisfying “Yes.” 
Both inside and outside the laboratory direct personal involvement in a bubble appears to 
be a potent means by which the market participants can learn to avoid them in the future 
having, in effect, undergone a collective form of aversion therapy. There is anecdotal evi-
dence that such learning goes on outside of the laboratory. For example, the stock market 
crash of October 1929 changed attitudes about investing for an entire generation, with exu-
berance only returning to the market in full flower during the “Go-Go Years” of the Sixties. 
Experimental markets which been through one or two experiments in which bubbles have 
formed and then burst similarly learn to avoid them.
Following Ben Franklin’s advice that “experience keeps a dear school, but the fool will 
learn in no other,” it would be highly beneficial to find a way to prevent bubbles without 
having to experience the deflation of even a single bubble first, much less the two or more 
that some experimental subjects appear to need to experience. Merely accelerating the 
existing learning process may reduce the number of crashes require to teach subjects not to 
collectively start a bubble in motion, it appears that something more is required if bubbles 
are to be entirely eliminated.
While learning to avoid bubbles poses an impressive challenge for the market mecha-
nism, experiments involving asymmetric information indicate that very sophisticated learn-
ing is possible in a market environment. This type of sophistication is demanded by eco-
nomic theories that depend on extended notions of rationality, such the “rational expecta-
tions” invoked in the monetary theories of Robert Lucas [1972]. Nonetheless, sophisticated 
learning does not occur automatically and how the markets are organized can play a critical 
role in aiding or inhibiting the type of learning require to mitigate bubbles. A careful reap-
praisal of the existing experimental evidence can aid in the development of ways to avoid 
bubbles both inside and outside of the laboratory.
How Markets Learn to Signal
Ross  Miller  and  Charles  Plott  [1985]  conducted  the  earliest  market  experiments  that 
required any explicit learning by market participants.2 (The “learning” of the competitive 
price and quantity in standard market experience is more an emergent property of the mar-
ket—or “spontaneous order” as F. A. Hayek referred to it—can occur without any apparent 
conscious effort of the part of subjects.) In contrast to the traditional market experiments 
pioneered by Vernon Smith [1962], in which buyers exchanged identical items that could 
be viewed as perfect substitutes for one another, the Miller-Plott experiments were the rst 
market experiments in which items of different “qualities” were traded in the same market. 
In these experiments, only the seller knew the quality of an item at the point of sale, the 
buyer did not discover the quality until after the trade had been consummated. Without 
any loss of theoretical generality, these experiments limited sellers to two specic quality Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  4
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levels, using low-quality items called “Regulars” and high-quality items called “Supers.” 
Furthermore, in each period the quality that a seller could produce was exogenously deter-
mined, so that sellers assigned to produce Supers could not intentionally “rip off” buyers 
by delivering Regulars instead.3
Sellers of Supers were able to distinguish themselves by “signaling” that their item for 
sale was a Super by attaching “stripes” to it. The parameters for these signaling experi-
ments were designed so that the unit cost of stripes was sufciently less for sellers of 
Supers than it was for sellers of Regulars enabling the market to effectively separate the 
two groups, with Regulars selling at a lower price and with fewer stripes than Supers. 
These experiments were designed as a direct test of the signaling model developed by 
Michael Spence [1974], which has multiple Nash-like equilibria in which the signal (stripes) 
are used to distinguish the two qualities. Labor markets in which education was the signal 
inspired this model; however, the Miller-Plott experiments changed the setting to a con-
sumer product market in order to avoid any prior associations or special expectations that 
subjects might attach to the roles of employer and employee.
Spence’s model and the later refinements of it do not specify how sellers learn to send 
the signal and buyers learn to recognize it, only that a signaling equilibrium is consistent 
with buyers associating the amount of the signal transmitted by the seller with the ultimate 
quality of the item purchased. Although the simplest form of Spence’s model provides the 
signal with no intrinsic value, the stripes used in the signaling experiments have enough 
value to buyers that sellers would provide in a competitive equilibrium even if they were 
unnecessary for signaling quality. The experiments were parameterized so that the quan-
tity of stripes required to distinguish Supers from Regular significantly exceed the amount 
that would be provided in a market where buyers could know the quality of an item at the 
point of sale. 
As in the single-product market experiments, the signaling experiments were run using a 
sequence of consecutive periods in order to see if repetition was sufficient to allow the 
market to converge towards one of the signaling equilibria. In the signaling experiments, 
it was necessary to assign Regulars and Supers to sellers at random each period so that 
buyers could only use the number of stripes and not which seller sold the unit as a signal 
of its quality. Furthermore, while single-product experiments, such as those pioneered by 
Vernon Smith, required the market to discover the values of two variables (price and quan-
tity), signaling experiments placed a heavier information burden on the market, requiring 
not only that it determine the value of six variables (price, quantity, and stripes for both 
Supers and Regulars) but also that it establish the functional relationship between stripes 
and quality. 
The first few signaling experiments were conducted using California Institute of Tech-
nology (Caltech) undergraduates as subjects and these initial experiments confirmed (or at Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  5
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least failed to refute) Spence’s signaling theory. In these experiments, the market showed 
a strong tendency to approach the most efficient of the signaling equilibria, i.e., the one 
that required the least possible number of stripes that would allow sellers of Supers to 
distinguish themselves from sellers of Regulars. This result was predicted by later refine-
ments of Spence’s theory.4 The Caltech subject pool, however, consisted largely of individu-
als—aspiring scientists and engineers—who had been selected, in part, on the basis of 
their pattern-recognition ability, which is an important element of effective market signal-
ing. In other subject pools, such as those recruited at community colleges, the market had 
a more difcult time learning that stripes could serve as a signal of quality.
The original signaling experiments were conducted in the early 1980s using blackboards 
and white chalk, these experiments were too complex for the computer-based experimental 
software that was still under development. The key technological innovation in these exper-
iments was the use of intercoms and citizen band radios to transmit orders between buyers 
and sellers who were segregated from each other in different classrooms. This “channel-
ing” of information prevented the subjects from using their voices and physical gestures 
to transmit information, so that any signaling that occurring was limited to market orders 
and transactions. The other major difference from the market experiments conducted with 
a single market was that instead of maintaining a single “market book” on the blackboard 
a separate one was kept for each possible level of stripes (usually the integers from zero to 
thirty). The blackboard was arranged so that the number of stripes increased as one moved 
from left to right. As in previous market experiments, when a transaction was consum-
mated it was indicated by circling the relevant bid or offer on the blackboard.
There was a strong tendency for Supers to contain more stripes that Regulars regardless 
of subject pool or experimental parameters. This did not always reflect a conscious effort of 
the part of the sellers of Supers to distinguish their items, but was instead a consequence of 
their cost advantage for supplying stripes to the market. Furthermore, sellers did not know 
exactly how buyers valued stripes—the only feedback that they received was that supplied 
through the market mechanism. Indeed, the value of stripes to buyers was structured so 
that the higher prices required for sellers to sell units with several stripes at a profit would 
only be worthwhile to buyers if the unit was almost certain to be a Super.
It required only a minor institutional change to get the market to learn how to signal and 
converge toward equilibrium. At the end of each period when the quality of each unit was 
revealed, Regulars and Supers were circled with contrasting colors of chalk. (Previously, 
qualities had simply been indicated using an “R” or “S” written next to the circled transac-
tion in white chalk.) Buyers who saw the Super color on the right side of the blackboard and 
the Regular color on the left would often make the connection between stripes and quality 
instantaneously. (This discovery was so dramatic that it called to mind the image of a bulb 
lighting up above their heads.)Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  6
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In the absence of colored chalk, some of the signaling experiments failed to exhibit the 
stability that characterizes single-market experiments. Rather than converge to a signaling 
equilibrium, the market would simply move from one unstable and inefficient allocation to 
another without converging. Although these signaling experiments were parameterized so 
that they would each have a unique efficient signaling equilibrium and several inefficient 
ones, some experiments exhibited behavior that suggested the nonexistence of equilibrium. 
Such a situation is possible only when the signaling cost advantage for sellers of Supers is 
sufficiently small.5
The stability issues that can arise in signaling experiments arises because of the addi-
tional burden that signaling places on the subjects. In a single-market experiment, only 
the bare minimum of individual economic rationality appears necessary for convergence 
to equilibrium—the auction mechanism itself provides so much of the impetus towards 
equilibrium that convergence can withstand signicant deviations from rationality by the 
subjects.6 Convergence to a signaling equilibrium requires that some of the sellers learn 
how to send signals and that some of buyers learn how to receive them. While not every 
buyer and seller needs to “get the signal” in order for the market to approach a signaling 
equilibrium, without a critical mass of savvy buyers and sellers driving the market it is 
more difcult to reach an equilibrium. 
It can be useful to think of buyers and sellers in a signaling market as looking for a path 
that uses the signal to connect them. By altering the parameters that determine the cost of 
signaling and the value of quality, the experimenter can make the path wider (and easier 
to discover) or narrower (and more difficult to discover) or can even make it disappear 
entirely in the case where no equilibrium exists. The Miller-Plott experiments found that 
the market converged to a signaling equilibrium more quickly and with greater frequency 
when the path was wider. In addition, the use of colored chalk aided subjects who had 
become temporarily “lost” in ultimately finding the path to equilibrium.
The instability seen in the signaling experiments that arose from the failure of an effec-
tive signaling mechanism to emerge spontaneously may be less dramatic than the instabil-
ity of a market bubble; however, the fact that a minor institutional change—the use of col-
ored chalk to distinguish Supers from Regulars—can help stabilize the market and guide 
it towards an efficient allocation indicates that relatively trivial changes in market institu-
tions might help prevent bubbles from forming. Neoclassical economic theory makes no 
provision for colored chalk or any other representative method to affect individual choices 
and the equilibrium allocations that are generated by them. In fact, the learning induced 
by colored chalk may itself by viewed as irrational because it significantly alters individual 
behavior without changing any of the variables considered relevant to the economic choices 
faced by individuals in the market.Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  7
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In a signaling experiment, making the connection between stripes and quality is in an 
individual’s rational best interests only when the market collectively learns to make the con-
nection. This learning can occur even if the individual subjects never become consciously 
aware that signaling is taking place. A seller of a Super-quality product who has figured out 
that Regular-quality sellers cannot economically produce units enough stripes to imitate 
his or her product will be unable to recoup the cost of the stripes if none of the buyers is 
willing to pay a premium price. It is, in fact, irrational for a seller to send a signal when 
there are no buyers capable of receiving it. 
The instability caused by the failure of buyers and sellers to learn how to use stripes as 
a means of distinguishing Supers from Regulars does not appear to be related to individual 
deviations from rationality of the sort documented by psychologists and economists dating 
back to the pioneering work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.7 While buyers may 
not be able to update the probability that a unit will be a Super conditional on the number 
of stripes it contains in a properly Bayesian manner, this failure comes not from shifting 
frames of reference, but rather from a failure to notice the link between quality and stripes 
quickly enough to provide sellers with the feedback necessary to transmit the signal.
Bubbles Under the Microscope
Markets that bubble to excess and then crash exhibit their instability in a more dramatic 
way than markets in which signaling fails to take hold, but the underlying problem may 
be quite similar. For asset markets to be both efficient and stable, individuals must learn 
to make the connection between an asset’s price and its expected future cash flows. For 
example, some of the most basic bubble experiments allow trade in an asset that pays a 
dividend of $0.24 at the end of each of 15 periods. At the beginning of the 15-period experi-
ment, the asset will generate a total cash flow of $3.60 with certainty, which gives it a com-
petitive market value of $3.60. After each period’s dividend payment of $0.24, the “intrin-
sic value” of the asset based on its cash flows declines by exactly the dividend amount until 
it becomes worthless after the last dividend is paid and the experiment concludes. More 
intricate versions of this basic bubble experiment make the dividend payment uncertain 
in order to stimulate the natural trade that would arise between more and less risk-averse 
subjects, but the basic outcome of the experiment is unchanged: a bubble forms in virtually 
every instance.8
The path taken by the bubble usually follows the same general pattern. In the early peri-
ods of the experiment, the asset trades at a substantial discount to the value of its cash ows. 
Within a few periods, competition among subjects drives the price up to its intrinsic value, 
which by then has fallen from its initial level of $3.60. For example, the price of asset might 
rise from $2.20 in the Period 1 to its intrinsic value of $2.88 in Period 4 ($3.60 minus three Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  8
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dividend payments of $0.24) at that same time that its intrinsic value has dropped from 
$3.60 down to $2.88.
Subjects who participate in this experiment for the first time appear to be learning the 
lesson that the price of the asset always increases by generalized from how prices behave 
in the first few periods, and so they continue to bid its price up even as its intrinsic value 
declines steadily towards zero.9 The result is a bubble in which the price of the asset greatly 
overshoots its intrinsic value until it nally crashes below it when just a few periods are 
remaining in the experiment and subjects must nally face up to the reality of holding an 
overvalued asset. The initial rise in the asset price serves to mask the subjects’ ability to 
learn that the market price of the asset should be near its intrinsic value. In the typical 
bubble experiment, it takes one or more 15-period repetitions before a given pool of sub-
jects learns to avoid a bubble.
The instability found in bubble experiments, like that of the signaling experiments, cannot 
readily be traced to any inconsistency or irrationality in individual choices. The bubble 
experiments are designed so that the intrinsic value of the asset is never in doubt. Regard-
less of whether the dividend payments are deterministic or drawn from a known random 
distribution, most bubble experiments are conducted so that the experimenter knows that 
every subject has complete knowledge of the asset’s intrinsic value throughout the experi-
ment by posting the expected total payoff on each subject’s computer monitor. Additionally, 
subjects may be asked to estimate the total value of the remaining dividend payments to 
make sure that they are receiving the message about the asset’s value.
At the same time that subjects are learning about the asset’s intrinsic value, the market 
teaches them two things that can undermine that knowledge. First, as the asset price moves 
towards equilibrium in the early periods, subjects see that prices tend to increase over time. 
Second, because this increase occurs as the intrinsic value is decreasing, subjects learn that 
the market price does not need to track the intrinsic value, at least over the short run. Until 
the markets crashes as the experiment nears its conclusion, subjects who learn to ignore 
the asset’s intrinsic value are rewarded by speculative profits, while those who follow it are 
quickly priced out of the market. Indeed, in experiments that allow selling short, subjects 
who sell the asset short may not only lose money, should they liquidate their short positions 
too soon, their purchases can help sustain the bubble.10
Filling Holes in the Market
A notable similarity between the signaling and bubble experiments is that both involve 
incomplete market systems. Although the signaling market facilitates trade in items with 
every possible number of stripes, it does not allow trade in markets for Supers and Regulars 
directly, creating a gap in the market system. In the presence of a mechanism that would 
enforce or guarantee quality, the necessary markets could exist and the signaling value of Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  9
Miller Risk Advisors
stripes would vanish. Signaling emerges as the market’s way of dealing with incomplete 
markets for quality.
The bubble experiments are also missing keys markets, those for future delivery of the 
asset. In a perfect world of complete markets, subjects would be able to trade not only in 
the “spot” market that provides direct ownership of the asset, but also in forward markets 
that provide for the buyer of the contract to receive the asset from its seller in a specified 
future period of the experiment.11 Hence, at the beginning of the experiment there would 
be 14 additional forward markets, one each for Period 2 through Period 15.
It is worth examining how prices in the forward markets should behave in the simple 
case of a fixed dividend of $0.24 at the end of each period. Consider the price of a forward 
contract for delivery in Period 2 that trades during Period 1. Although prices in bubble 
experiments usually move higher during the early periods, it is unlikely that the Period 
2 forward contract will exceed the spot price at any time during Period 1. Were such an 
opportunity to present itself, a subject could purchase the asset on the spot market and 
simultaneously sell a forward contract at a higher price, yielding not only an immediate 
profit, but also the $0.24 dividend that is paid at the end of Period 1. When one fully takes 
the dividend into account, not only must the Period 2 forward contract be priced at least 
$0.24 less that the spot price in Period 1, but also the Period 3 forward contract must be 
at least $0.24 less than the Period 2 forward contract, and so on to Period 15. If all 14 
futures contracts are actively traded—as we will see below this is a very big “if”—then the 
fact that the Period 15 forward contract cannot have a negative price means that the spot 
price during Period 1 must stay above $3.36. (If the Period 15 forward contract trades at its 
intrinsic value of $0.24, then Period 1 spot price is pushed up to at least its intrinsic value 
of $3.60).
With a properly functioning set of forward contracts, the downward pressure on prices 
from period to period will be apparent to subjects from the beginning of the experiment. It 
is still possible for a bubble to form that raises the price of the asset in the spot market and 
all of the forward markets above their intrinsic values; however, if the pattern of declining 
forward prices that is easily generated by the arbitrage activities of even a single rational 
subject is detected by other subjects, the illusion that prices will increase from period to 
period, which appears necessary for the formation of bubbles, will be difficult to maintain.
Bubble experiments are already among the most complex experiments that are con-
ducted on a regular basis and adding a full complement of forward markets further compli-
cates them. David Porter and Vernon Smith [1995] have conducted bubble experiments in 
which they have added a single forward market for the asset with delivery at the midpoint 
of the experiment in Period 8. While this additional forward market still leaves the market 
system substantially incomplete, it does appear to attenuate the bubble that forms in experi-
ments with inexperienced subjects.Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  10
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The difficulty with using forward markets to prevent bubbles in both experimental and 
naturally-occurring markets is that these markets can only exert a stabilizing influence 
only if they transact enough business to generate meaningful prices. In their current design, 
bubble experiments already provide extremely limited economic incentives to trade on the 
spot market because the asset has the same intrinsic value of everyone; trade in the forward 
markets, especially a multitude of them, has even less motivation. Indeed, on the major 
futures markets of the world, many contracts go for days or weeks without a trade and 
provide no useful price information to the market system.
The potential for futures contracts to limit asset-pricing bubbles works somewhat dif-
ferently in naturally occurring markets than it does in the laboratory. In contrast to the 
experimental market, in which the asset price should decline from period to period in a 
competitive equilibrium, the futures price of an asset that pays little or no dividends can be 
expected to increase over time so that the capital gains from holding it provide a suitable 
return on the capital invested in it. Hence, futures prices for such assets (or indexes that 
consist of them) increase as the delivery date move further into the future. If the future 
prospects of an asset are sufficiently promising, any increase in the futures prices will tend 
to drag the spot price up with it.
Consider, for example, the stock of a company, let us call it hightech.com, that currently 
trades at $50/share and that the market believes will trade at $200/share in six months. 
(Such highly optimistic projections were common during the run-up in Internet-related 
stocks.) If a futures contract for delivery of hightech.com in six months were publicly avail-
able, a uniform belief that a share would be worth $200 then would drive the futures price 
up towards $200/share.12 Such a move would be inconsistent with a current stock price of 
$50 because the simultaneous purchase of the stock on the spot market and the sale of it 
on the futures market would give a return of $150/share for an investment of $50/share 
made over six months, which is vastly beyond any realistic cost of capital for this invest-
ment. In such a situation, the existence of the futures contract means that either the pres-
ent or future assessment of the stock value must be reappraised until the spot and futures 
prices are brought into equilibrium. As in the experimental market, there is still the possi-
bility that a bubble would form in which all these prices simultaneously exceed the stock’s 
intrinsic value, but this would presumably be more difcult than generating a bubble in 
the spot market alone. Furthermore, to the extent that a temporary scarcity of stock issues 
that provide speculators with a “technology play” helps fuel the bubble, the existence of 
stock futures provides an inexhaustible outlet for speculation that does not carry the time 
premium associated with other alternative, such as options. While many stocks would not 
warrant trade in futures contracts, it is likely that speculative issues would attract sufcient 
volume to maintain a full complement of them.Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  11
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During the Internet boom years, there was no organized mechanism for trading forward 
contracts in individual U.S. stocks, the best that one could do was to trade in relatively 
illiquid “equity swaps” created by investment banks. Trade in standardized futures or for-
ward contracts on individual shares had been made temporarily illegal by the 1982 Shad-
Johnson Accord that delineated the securities under SEC and CFTC jurisdiction and left 
stock futures in limbo until their status was finally resolved in 2000. Some astute financial 
observers believe that futures on individual Internet stocks might have prevented the Inter-
net bubble from forming at all.13
To the extent that futures contracts on stock indexes were available as an alternative way 
to cash in on the Internet boom, they appear to have been ineffectual in bringing the bubble 
under control. Futures contracts on the Nasdaq Composite Index and the Nasdaq 100 were 
heavily traded during the period; however, because they averaged the returns from many 
stocks, including a signicant proportion with no connection to the Internet boom, they 
lacked the excitement and potential stratospheric returns of individual Internet companies. 
Internet index futures, such as the ISDEX contract on the Kansas City Board of Trade, 
appeared only as the boom was reaching its crest and they failed to attract much attention 
from the nancial media.
Efforts to prevent bubbles by making markets more complete are further complicated by 
the difficulty of establishing an objective intrinsic value for securities that have speculative 
appeal. In the signaling experiments, both Supers and Regulars had well-defined intrinsic 
values, all the market had to do was figure out how to encode and decode that information 
with stripes. While the expected future cash flows from highly speculative investments 
may be highly variably and subject to vast differences of opinion, an objective market con-
sensus is still possible. What is troubling in the case of the Internet bubble was a popular 
line of analysis that appeared to refute the fundamental economic belief that the value of 
an asset should be equal to the sum of its future discounted cash flows. The need to ground 
valuation in tangible future returns was often dismissed as “old economic thinking” that 
was irrelevant to the “new economy.” While such analysis constitutes a serious departure 
from rationality, the lack of a valuation methodology for new technology ventures that is 
truly objective helps to facilitate such flights of fancy.
It is also possible for bubbles to form in which the prices of assets can be individually 
rationalized, but their aggregate valuation is inconsistent with any plausible market out-
come. When many companies are competing for dominance in the same market and only 
one or two winners are likely to emerge, it is possible that a bubble will form in which 
every firm is valued as if it will emerge as the ultimate victor. The development of markets 
that will not only highlight such inconsistencies but also allow arbitrageurs to profit from 
them and nip any nascent bubble in the bud requires better models than those currently 
available. Robert Shiller has championed the use of “macro markets,” such as future con-Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  12
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tracts based on a country’s GDP, as a way of helping to promote more rational and informa-
tive markets. Given the difficulty of correlating macro variables with specific financial 
assets, it is difficulty to see how a market-generated prediction of aggregate economic activ-
ity could control any bubble that was less than universal in scope. 
Highlighting Bubbles
Just as colored chalk could be used to help guide the market to a signaling equilibrium, it 
is possible that a similar method could be employed to guide the value of an asset towards 
its intrinsic value and away from bubbly excess. Exactly what mechanism might be able to 
contain the market has yet to be determined; however, all possible methods are likely to 
face similar challenges. Existing methods that provide information about the intrinsic value 
of an asset to experimental subjects has not been successful at mitigating bubbles.
A possible way of providing rational guidance to the financial markets is to report the 
intrinsic value of an asset along with its market price in the listings provided in newspa-
pers and over the Internet. There is substantial precedent for this practice for closed-end 
mutual funds, whose intrinsic value can be explicitly determined from their asset holdings. 
While the tendency for the price of closed-end mutual funds to diverge from their intrin-
sic (or net asset) value has been acknowledged by even the most ardent advocates of the 
efficient-market theory, such disparities are usually so small as to not approach constitut-
ing a bubble.
An assortment of relative valuation measures, such as book value and the ratio of price 
to earnings, are readily available to investors; however, from the end of the 1990s and 
into the 2000s indications that stocks in general, and technology stocks in particular, were 
historically overvalued seemed to have little impact on prices. The ability of major stock 
indexes such as the S&P 500 Stock Index and the Nasdaq Composite Stock Index to sport 
new record price/earnings ratios with each passing month tended to reward investors who 
ignored the early signs of overvaluation and punished those who heeded it. A similar phe-
nomenon appeared during the Japanese stock market bubble that lasted into the early 1990s. 
In that bubble, U.S. brokers were known to reassure their customers that the absurdly high 
price/earnings ratios seen on Japanese stocks merely reflected differences in accounting 
practices and not a reflection of a market bubble that have gone out of control.
If a respected financial publication were to institute its own version of colored chalk by 
highlighting overvalued stocks (e.g., ones with price/earnings or price/sales above a speci-
fied cutoff) much as it highlights stocks with unusually high volume or price movement, 
it would be purely a matter or chance whether its efforts would be sufficient to prevent 
bubbles in those issues. Certainly, if a pattern emerged where any stock that rated a warn-
ing would immediately succumb to selling pressure that would drop its price back in line 
with its value, this mechanism could effective limit stock prices. Indeed, given an objec-Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  13
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tive and open method for determining overvaluation, anticipation of the selling that being a 
highlighted issue would bring might pre-empt most stocks from achieved this distinction.
Unfortunately, this heavy-handed approach to bubble prevention is likely to be ineffec-
tual. There are almost certain to be stocks that might appear objectively overvalued, but 
deserve their high prices because of outstanding growth prospects or other special situa-
tions. Such issues could come to dominate the highlighted list since they would be able to 
survive the automatic selling that would materialize as they approach overvaluation. When 
a sufficient number of issues continued to rise once they had been highlighted, likely aided 
by the purchases of short-sellers covering their positions, the market would then learn that 
it should no longer avoid shares that appear to be overvalued. This sequence of events 
would effectively discredit the overvaluation method and provide the opening for truly over-
valued shares to escape the discipline of the market.
While the financial media never explicitly drew the chalk lines that distinguished over-
valued companies during the stock market boom of the late 1990s, the extreme overvalu-
ation of many companies were repeatedly highlighted in only slightly less extreme man-
ners. The ability of blatantly overvalued shares to move even higher provided positive feed-
back to speculative holders that masked any considerations of intrinsic value.
Conclusion
The experimental evidence compiled to date indicates that under normal market circum-
stances market bubbles may be difficult to eliminate. This article has examined experi-
ments in which market efficiency relies entails learning at an aggregate level to try to 
gain insight into how market might learn to avoid bubbles. Two of the more promising 
approaches involve patching holes in the market system with the appropriate forward or 
futures markets and supplementing the market with information (colored chalk) that guides 
prices in the right direction. These two remedies, either alone or in combination, are espe-
cially appealing because if they are shown to work in the laboratory the development of 
real-world policies that incorporate them can be straightforward, as opposed to the elimina-
tion of bubbles through past experience with comparable real-world crashes.
In both the business press and the legal system, much of the blame for the Internet 
bubble has been heaped on the stock analysts who placed exorbitant valuations and price 
targets on the stock of Internet-related companies. While laboratory experiments had yet to 
incorporate these analysts into their design, it is clear for existing experimental results that 
their presence is not necessary for the creation of bubbles and that they may well simply 
make convenient deep-pocketed scapegoats after the fact. Although subjects in a labora-
tory setting can eventual learn not to get involved in bubbles, it is not so clear whether the 
legal and political system in which our markets can so easily learn to find a cure for bubbles 
rather than simply treat the symptoms. Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  14
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Notes
∗ The paper draws on ideas developed while writing Paving Wall Street [Ross Miller, 
2002]. The author beneted tremendously from thoughtful discussions with Gunduz Cagi-
nalp and Vernon Smith.
1 Ross Miller [2002] contains a detailed account of the path from Edward Chamberlin’s 
[1948] rst experiments to the Vernon Smith, Gerald Suchanek, and Arlington Williams 
[1988] bubble experiments. Milestone experiments in development of bubble experiments 
are described by Vernon Smith [1962], Ross Miller, Charles Plott, and Vernon Smith [1977], 
and Robert Forsythe, Thomas Palfrey, and Charles Plott [1982].
2 Game-theoretic experiments in which a small group of subjects (often just two) would 
learn to cooperate predated experiments in which any learning was mediated by the market 
mechanism.Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?  16
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3 This moral hazard problem was examined in several experiments based on George 
Akerlof’s [1970] lemons model by Michael Lynch, Ross Miller, Charles Plott, and Russell 
Porter [1991] that employ the same basic design as the signaling experiments.
4 See John Riley [1975] and Charles Wilson [1977] for more advanced version of the 
signaling model that eliminate many of the inefcient signaling equilibria.
5 Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz [1976] prove a theoretical demonstration of the 
possible nonexistence of a signaling equilibrium under normal circumstances. Although 
Miller and Plott had considered running such experiments, the observed behavior of mar-
kets in which a signaling equilibrium existed but could not be determined pointed out the 
likely futility of this avenue of investigation.
6 Dhananjay Gode and Shyam Sunder [1993] show that the rules of the standard auc-
tion-based market can guide a single market to equilibrium even with robot traders pro-
grammed to place random orders. Such results cannot be expected to carry over to markets 
where learning or the formation of expectations is required of the traders.
7 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman [1987] provide a summary of this research and 
its relation to theories of economic rationality.
8 The general properties attributed to experimental bubble markets in this article drawn 
heavy on the papers by Vernon Smith, Gerald Suchanek, and Arlington Williams [1988], 
Porter and Smith [1995], and Gunduz Caginalp, David Porter, and Vernon Smith [1998 and 
2000].
9 See G. Caginalp and D. Balenovich [1999] for a formal model of how momentum 
might drive an asset market bubble.
10 The “limits of arbitrage” issues facing short-sellers analyzed by Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny [1997] do not arise in these experiments.
11 The main difference between forward contracts and futures contracts is that futures 
contracts provide for periodic settlement of gains and losses in the value of the contract 
in advance of the delivery date as a way to reduce the possibility that the contract will be 
breached. The futures markets used in Porter and Smith [1995] are technically forward 
markets because settlement in cash occurs only at the end of the experiment.
12 In a world with relatively efcient futures markets, analysts’ projections that a stock 
will increase by 300% in six months might become pointless. Such a proclamation can 
be recast to the spot price by simple discounting; hence, any analyst’s statement that the 
market believes and is reected in the futures price automatically implies a specic spot 
price.
13 Holman Jenkins [2000] advocates futures on individual stocks as a way of preventing 
market bubbles.